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ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF U.S. STRATEGIC
AND FOREIGN POLICY
On October 16, 1982, alumni of the University of Pennsylvania Law School
and friends of Professor Schwartz sponsored the first Louis B. Schwartz
International Trade Conference at the Law School in Philadelphia. The
conference addressed the timely issue of "Economic Sanctions as an Instru-
ment of U.S. Strategic and Foreign Policy", focusing upon economic and
political consequences of sanctions for the United States and its allies as well
as for the target nation. The panelists for the conference were:
Noyes E. LEECH, Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law, University
of Pennsylvania Law School
Lee R. MARKS, Ginsburg, Feldman, Weil, and Bress, Chartered, Washington,
D.C.; Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, 1977-79
John MASLEN, Adviser of the Directorate, Relations with State Trading
Countries, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, Belgium
Robert H. MUNDHEIM, Dean and University Professor of Law and Finance,
University of Pennsylvania Law School; General Counsel, U.S. Treasury,
1976-1980
Louis B. SCHWARTZ, Benjamin Franklin and University Professor of Law,
University of Pennsylvania Law School
William Howard TAFT, IV, General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense
Introduction
Although economic sanctions against Argentina, Chile, Iran and Rhodesia
were also discussed, most of the Conference focused upon the sanctions
announced by President Reagan on December 29, 1981, intended to deter
Soviet encouragement of martial law in Poland. The most controversial of
those sanctions, the so-called "pipeline sanctions", commanded the greatest
amount of attention from Conference participants.
The Commerce Department issued the pipeline sanctions on December 30,
1981, under the authority given to it by Congress in the Export Administration
Act of 1979 [I]. The regulations extended the existing export licensing require-
ment covering trade with the U.S.S.R. in equipment and technical data for oil
and gas production and exploration [2], to equipment and technical data for oil
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and gas refinement and transmission [3]. The December 30, 1981, regulations
also suspended processing of license applications for exports to the U.S.S.R.
The Commerce Department issued amendments to the regulations on June
22, 1982, which extended licensing to the export of foreign goods and technical
data by companies owned or controlled by U.S. persons [4]. The amendments
also applied to foreign-produced goods whose production depended on U.S.
technology licensed by a company subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The June 22
regulations also suspended the processing of license applications for export to
Poland.
The pipeline sanctions were very controversial at the time of the Con-
ference, and until President Reagan rescinded them effective November 13,
1982 [5]. Conference participants voiced many of the same concerns raised by
U.S. corporations, foreign firms, and foreign countries affected by the pipeline
sanctions.
Dean Mundheim
Our topic this morning is economic sanctions as an instrument of U.S.
strategic and foreign policy, and it is most timely. Our first speaker, Bill Taft,
will set forth the theme of our present policy and its rationale.
Mr. Taft
Thank you. I will describe the present policy of the government. Our subject
concerns using economic sanctions against Communist countries, particularly
Eastern European countries and the U.S.S.R., in order to have some impact on
their power and on the policies which they pursue.
First, it is important to remember that our economic policy is carried on in
the context of our national security policies and overall foreign policies, and is
one component of our overall bilateral relationship with Eastern European
countries rather than our dominant concern. These countries are not our allies.
Some of them are members of a military alliance, and one in particular poses a
substantial and growing military threat to our country and to our allies. In the
Third World, these countries have pursued policies inimical to our interests,
while attempting to frustrate our own policies. Thus, while the terms of our
economic relations with the Eastern European nations are established, our
primary concerns must be national security and our other foreign policies.
The national security issue should not be brushed aside too quickly. In
many circumstances, national security concerns do have a direct impact on our
terms of trade with the Eastern bloc. Trade can result in development of
technologically advanced systems, because the Soviet Union and its allies use
trade to collect technological information. The Soviet Union's use of this
technology to increase its military capabilities causes us tremendous expense.
We in turn must develop systems to respond to the threats that, with the
benefit of the technology received through trade, these countries are able to
pose.
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The direct solution is economic sanctions - the policy that we will not trade
with these countries in technological equipment which will- advance their
military capabilities. Our allies are generally agreed that when a country
threatens you, you withhold items which will enhance its military capability.
The economic sanctions that we have imposed to restrict trade with the
U.S.S.R. and its allies are the result of a straightforward application of this
principle, which is the policy we start with in the government. It requires
working with our friends, at which we will continue to improve as evidence
mounts that the technology made available through trade has indeed increased
the military threats posed to the Western alliance.
When the economic sanction is directed toward achieving a foreign policy
objective rather than national security, the analysis is more subtle. Unless the
unusual situation arises where the sanction is a total one directed toward
essentially undermining the countries involved, for example against Rhodesia
in the late 1960s, sanctions must be established very carefully.
The relationship between a selective sanction and a selected foreign policy
objective is part of our overall foreign relations and economic dealings with the
countries affected. The trick is to identify the conduct you wish to affect, and
to select the economic sanction appropriate to that goal. The sanction should
be designed to positively affect the conduct of the country involved. If this
effect is a practical economic consequence of the sanction, that is to the good,
but it is not essential. You can create a relationship between the conduct and
the sanction simply by stating it. The sanction is appropriate in that inter-
mediate area where military force is excessive but where the expression of
moral outrage is simply inadequate.
What kind of sanction and what kind of conduct should be matched up?
First, a sanction, if successful, should have an adverse effect. For example, if
the pipeline sanctions were completely successful, the pipeline would be
retarded or abandoned, an objective which the United States supports. The
grain embargo is different since our policy is not to prevent the Soviet Union
from feeding its people. That would be an undesirable result.
A second point is that the imposition of the sanction should be equitably
borne within the country imposing it. This policy is a matter of common sense
and political practicality. A sanction that bears unequally on one segment of
our own society will be difficult to sustain over the long run. This was another
defect of the grain embargo - it imposed an extremely heavy burden on just
one segment of our society. The pipeline sanction would have an identifiable
impact on our society and on particular segments of it, but in this case the
burdens imposed on the directly affected segments of our industry are smaller,
and can be more easily accommodated, than could the grain embargo.
Finally, the foreign policy or conduct of the country that is the subject of
the sanction should be both discrete and newly established. The Afghanistan
situation and the Polish situation, which provoked the two different em-
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bargoes, were both changes in the policy of the Soviet Union vith respect to
Afghanistan and Poland. Because it is a change, such a policy presumably can
be reversed and this helps to give logic to the sanction.
If the targeted conduct is indeed reversed, you need to be prepared to lift
the sanction, and the country that is being sanctioned should receive some
immediate benefit from its removal. If that nation wants the sanction lifted,
the incentive to reverse the objectionable policy will be strong.
To make the sanction effective, to make it something that hurts the target,
the cooperation of our allies must be obtained. We have had difficulties with
this goal in the pipeline case and the grain embargo. Certain types of conduct
should not occur without protest, however, and in specific circumstances the
United States must attempt the sanction even if we are not able to obtain the
cooperation of our allies. Thus, we should stress to the countries involved that
we are concerned about the particular conduct, and that we will take steps
towards reversing the undesirable conduct.
I think this discussion has outlined our policy and I am prepared to defend
it. We now call on Lee Marks.
Mr. Marks
We are focusing on the use of export controls to influence Communist
behavior, mostly in the context-of the pipeline. But I think it is wise to start
with some historical perspective. First, there is nothing new about the use of
economic sanctions to influence behavior. We have had import controls for
long portions of our history and have used them to reward friends and punish
nonfriends.
The obvious example is the denial of most-favored-nation treatment to
Communist countries, unless they meet certain conditions, mandated by sec-
tions 401-410 of the Trade Act of 1974 [6]. Also, the Jackson-Vanic amend-
ment, section 402 of the Trade Act, links most-favored-nation treatment to the
emigration practices of Communist countries: namely, to freedom of emigra-
tion [7]. Section 402 is an important illustration of one problem with the use of
sanctions to influence behavior - they may prove counterproductive. Although
the target was the Soviet Union, section 402 applies to all nonmarket-econony
countries. Most of these have no significant emigration restrictions, and their
existijag restrictions do not single out Jews; religiously based emigration
restrictions were one of the original targets of the Jackson-Vanik amendment
[8]. Nonetheless the law says that the President may not extend most-favored-
nation treatment unless he receives assurances from the country in question.
Because most of these countries find this requirement offensive for reasons
wholly unrelated to their emigration practices, section 402 has impeded
East-West trade with a number of countries whose behavior in fact does not
offend the legislative purpose.
We have had export controls at least since World War I under the Trading
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with the Enemy Act [9]. That Act now applies only in time of war; similar but
more restrictive powers apply under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act [10] for national emergencies. Under those laws, the President may
prohibit virtually any kind of economic transaction with a designated foreign
country - imports, exports, travel, and remittance. The International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act was the basis for the foreign asset controls
imposed on Iran. Export controls are extensively used against countries other
than Communist nations. During the Carter Administration, they were used to
enforce human rights. We impeded the sale of Boeing jets to Libya; embargoed
Uganda; embargoed all goods, including shoelaces and toilet paper, destined
for the police or military forces of South Africa; and in one random applica-
tion of economic sanctions to which I will return, we prevented Oshkosh Truck
Company of Wisconsin from fulfilling its contract to sell 400 trucks to Libya.
U.S. legislation contains a number of export controls aimed at combatting
human rights abuses. Foreign aid to all countries that grossly violate human
rights is prohibited under the Foreign Assistance Act [11], and for these
purposes foreign aid includes both AID assistance and Export-Import Bank
financing. The prohibition of Export-Import Bank financing is often quite
sufficient to prevent the consummation of an economic transaction. Indeed,
the Evans Amendment [12] prohibits Export-Import Bank financing for any
transaction in South Africa unless the Secretary of State certifies that the
South African party to the transaction applies the principles of Reverend Leon
Sullivan's nondiscrimination employment code to its workers. Needless to say,
there has been no Export-Import Bank financing in South Africa since the
passage of that amendment in 1978.
I would like to discuss the Oshkosh trucks contract, because it has several
things in common with the pipeline and because it preceded the Export
Administration Act of 1979 [13]. Most of our export controls are under that
Act, the successor to the Export Control Act of 1949 [14] and the Export
Administration Act of 1969 [15]. The 1979 Act was passed specifically to
restore some balance in favor of exports and against controls.
Oshkosh, a Wisconsin manufacturer, entered into a contract to sell 400
standard off-the-shelf trucks to the Libyan government. Libya insisted that the
force majeure clause in the contract exclude any reference to the imposition of
U.S. export controls. Oshkosh asked the Department of Commerce if it could
sell these trucks to Lybia. The Commerce Department said that the sale of
standard off-the-shelf trucks was under general license, which meant in effect
they were already licensed for export [16]. Ten months later, when the trucks
started coming off the assembly line, the State Department asked the Depart-
ment of Commerce to put the trucks under validated license procedure [17],
which requires a specific license for export, and then to deny the license. Why?
Quadaffi was growling at Sadat, our ally, who had recently gone to Jerusalem.
Nobody quite knew the proposed use for the trucks, but many strongly
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suspected that the Libyans would use them to haul tanks to the Egyptian
border.
Two features stood out in the Oshkosh situation. First, the U.S. Govern-
ment changed the rules in the middle of the game. When the contract was
negotiated and signed, Oshkosh could send the trucks; when they were ready
for shipment, we changed those rules. Second, there was nothing unique about
these trucks. Oshkosh had narrowly beaten out British Motors, Mercedes Benz,
BMW, and Renault to get the contract, and those companies stood willing and
able to supply the trucks without government restrictions. This demonstrated
both the futility of applying controls when the goods in question were freely
available elsewhere, and the unfairness of changing the rules.
The Export Administration Act of 1979 addresses both of those issues at
some length [18]. On the question of foreign availability, the Act states that the
President shall not impose export controls for foreign policy or national
security purposes on U.S. exports and technology which he determines are
available without restrictions from sources outside the United States, unless the
President determines that adequate evidence has been presented to him dem-
onstrating that the absence of export controls is detrimental [19]. In other
words, he should not impose controls unless, of course, he really wants to do
SO.
On the question of changing the rules, the Congress stated in section 2(6) of
the Act that: "uncertainty of export control policy can curtail the efforts of
American business to the detriment of the overall attempt to improve the trade
balance of the United States" [20]. It repeats that language in section 3 and
again in section 6 on foreign policy controls [21]. The pipeline controls are not
national security controls; they are foreign policy controls. Section 6 sets the
criteria for the President to consider in imposing foreign policy controls: "the
likely effect of the proposed controls on the export performance of the United
States,... the competitive position of the United States in the international
economy,... the international reputation of the United States as a supplier of
goods and technology", and the effects of controls on individual U.S. com-
panies and their existing contracts [22]. Of course, having solemnly considered
all of those matters, President Reagan nonetheless concluded, as did President
Carter with respect to Oshkosh, that the pipeline controls should be imposed.
Many claim that certainty is important for exports and that U.S. export
policy is neither consistent nor certain. It is in fact wholly clear, consistent, and
certain. Our export policy reserves the right to impose controls whenever we
want, on whomever we want, wherever we want and for whatever reason we
want. This policy is not without difficulty, but there is nothing unclear,
inconsistent, or uncertain about it.
I would argue that we pay a high and unmeasurable price for that policy.
The price is not only calculated by looking at sales forgone, but also by the fact
that we are increasingly regarded as unreliable suppliers. To buy turbines from
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the United States is risky when for any number of reasons spare parts may be
unavailable because of export controls. Countries that license technology from
the United States will have to consider, after the pipeline controls, what
restrictions may be imposed ten years later in situations wholly unforeseeable
at the time the licence is issued.
A client of mine illustrates this problem. It makes a device that a British
company wants to use in a weapons system. The order would be huge for this
U.S. company. The British company says it understands U.S. export controls
and that there are re-export problems. It wants a list of the countries that it
will be unable to export to, so that it can determine whether it can live with the
list. The company does not intend to sell weapons to the Communist bloc, so
there should not be any problem. Our answer is that we simply cannot provide
a list. In three years we may be angry at Iraq or Libya or South Africa or Iran,
or any other country, and we may tell you that you cannot re-export your
weapons system if it contains a device that is made in this country. The British
company's reaction to this explanation is wholly predictable.
One legal solution exists for a substantial part of the uncertainty, although it
would have frustrated the imposition of the controls in the pipeline case. It
would be to say that the relevant date for controls is the contract date, not the
delivery date. A company would be subject only to controls in existence on the
date it enters into a contract to sell goods. Six months or two years later, the
rules cannot be changed because the product has not been delivered yet. There
is logic and sence to this approach. In Bill Taft's point of view, it would deny
flexibility to the President, however, and in the pipeline case it would have
made the controls wholly ineffective.
Let us look again at the criteria in the Export Administration Act of 1979 as
they apply to the imposition of pipeline controls. Under section 6(b), the
President must consider these criteria when imposing, expanding, or extending
foreign policy export controls [23]. (In imposing national security controls, the
President has much more leeway.) The President shall consider, first, "the
probability that such controls will achieve the intended foreign policy
purpose...". There is not a lot of evidence that the pipeline is being slowed
down or that it won't be built.
The second criterion has to do with terrorism, which is irrelevant here.
The third is "the reaction of other countries to the imposition or expansion
of such export controls by the United States". It is fairly clear in this case what
that reaction is.
Fourth is the effects of the controls on U.S. reputation. This is considered
prior to imposing the controls.
The fifth criterion, "the ability of the United States to enforce the proposed
controls effectively", seems to be nonexistent in this case. The sixth one, "the
foreign policy consequences of not imposing controls", is hard to judge
because it is much more ambiguous [24].
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
Economic sanctions and U.S. strategic and foreign policy
Clearly, to look at these criteria objectively, the pipeline controls did not fall
within many of them. Interestingly enough, the criteria worked fairly well with
the grain embargo, but we have to consider who is bearing the cost of an
embargo. The contrast here is between workers in England, France, Germany,
and Italy, none of whom vote in American elections, and farmers in Iowa,
Idaho, Indiana, and Missouri, most of whom do vote and traditionally vote
Republican. I assume that is what Mr. Taft had in mind when he spoke about
equitably bearing the costs of export controls.
One aspect of the pipeline case which was not found in the Oshkosh truck
situation, although it is not new, is the issue of extraterritoriality. In the
pipeline case we did not impose controls only on goods or technology located
in the continental United States. Rather, we imposed controls on technology
that was located abroad, and in a variety of circumstances. In the celebrated
Fruehauf case in the middle 1960s, the Treasury Department ordered Fruehauf
Company in Deteroit to tell its French subsidiary, Fruehauf-France, to renege
on Fruehauf-France's contract to sell semi-trailers to another French company
for eventual export to China [25]. Fruehauf-France was a 70% owned sub-
sidiary. The minority directors went to a French court, which issued an order
appointing a temporary receiver, ousting the board of directors and directing
the Company to live up to its contract [26]. Faced with that, the Treasury
Department concluded that-Fruehauf-Detroit was not in control of the situa-
tion any longer and made no further effort against Fruehauf-Detroit or
Fruehauf-France. There was also a great furor with Canada in the 1960s
having to do with the proposed sale of Canadian Ford automobiles to the
People's Republic of China.
It was somewhat in reaction to both the Fruehauf and Canadian cases that
the Cuban export control regulations [27], drafted in large measure by Profes-
sor Lowenfeld, took a more reasoned and moderate stand on extraterritoriality
than had been the case before, or, until recently, since. Extraterritoriality is not
unique to export controls. We have the problem of extraterritoriality in many
areas of our legislation. Our boycott legislation has some aspects, as does the
enforcement of our security laws, internal revenue laws, etc. The Europeans for
the most part restrict their regulations to their own territory.
We reserve the right to regulate foreign corporations owned or controlled by
U.S. corporations in a variety of circumstances, for good reason. A multina-
tional corporation finds it easy to ship goods, services, or technology from
anywhere in the world so that if extraterritorial behavior was not regulated,
enforcing some of our laws would be very difficult. We have the basic idea,
again quite different from European ideas, that General Motors in France is a
U.S. company. By and large extraterritorial application of U.S. laws is not
confrontational. The Europeans are not angry that we subject U.S. subsidiaries
to foreign corrupt practices regulations abroad because it leaves their own
companies free to get large business orders that U.S. companies cannot get.
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Extraterritoriality of course is a matter of degree. The real problem with the
extraterritorial controls here is that they go further down the spectrum than we
have ever gone before. We are purporting in the pipeline case to extend
controls, not only to foreign licensees who have acquired technology under a
contract obligation to comply with export control regulations, but also to
foreign licensees who acquired the technology long ago and whose only link
with the United States is that they pay royalities under a licence agreement. In
one case, we are attempting to extend our jurisdiction to a subsidiary of a U.S.
company that is dealing not with American technology but with technology it
developed long before it was acquired by a U.S. corporation. The feeling in
Europe, as expressed by the EEC in its Brussels comments to the United States
[28], is that this is a form of economic imperialism which the Europeans find
unacceptable and which may ultimately prove unacceptable to the U.S. courts.
The pipeline case presents the further issue of foreign sovereign compulsion.
Here the Europeans have done more than protest; the English and the French
have ordered the subsidiaries in their countries to comply with their laws. In
the case of Dresser France [29], the police took physical possession of the
goods, requisitioned them, and put them on ships. Ultimately, a serious due
process question arises: whether the U.S. Commerce Department can blacklist
or deny privileges to a French company which violates U.S. regulations by
following an order from its own government on shipment from its own country
of goods and services to a third country.
Dean Mundheim
Thank you, Lee. I think you have set up some points of difference. Now, it
is useful to hear directly the European Community's reaction to sanctions.
John Maslen, can you give us an overview of that?
Mr. Maslen
Thank you very much, Dean Mundheim. My remarks will be confi.ned to
the case of the gas pipeline. I should say straight away that the European
Community is not against sanctions as such. We would agree with many of Mr.
Taft's comments. Economics and trade policies cannot be viewed in isolation,
but must be seen in the context of national security and foreign policy as a
whole. This fact is illustrated by the work done in the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe, where one of the main points stressed by Western
delegations is that none of the aspects of the conference - political, security,
economic, human rights - is independent; they all stand together. There
cannot be detente in the economic field and confrontation in the fields of
military or human rights activities. Furthermore, in the U.S. approach to
relations in Eastern Europe, security and foreign policy concerns are of
primary importance while economic policy is not a main concern. This is
largely for economic reasons. The flow of trade between Eastern and Western
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Europe is much more important to Western Europe than the East-West trade
flow is for the United States.
I should like to discuss some of the considerations raised by the U.S.
sanctions imposed against European firms in June [30]. In general terms, the
European Community, as it stated in legal comments made in July and August,
considers these measures contrary to international law and at variance with
rules and principles of U.S. law as well [31]. As to the political and economic
aspects, the U.S. measures are liable to affect a wide variety of business
activities. The primary purpose of these measures is to deny or delay the
construction of this pipeline, but that the measures will have this effect is
unlikely. The pipeline from Siberia can be completed using Soviet technology
and production and capacity diverted from other parts of their gas transmis-
sion program. Gas could still flow to the Community starting as scheduled in
1984, because there is substantial spare capacity in the existing pipeline system
which would cover the requirements of the early phase of the gas supply plan.
The most important justification for the U.S. measures has been the danger
that the Community will become dependent on Soviet gas supplies. We have
all seen discussions in the press about just how dangerous that dependence is.
Even when the gas contracts are all fulfilled and gas is flowing at its maxinum
rate, it will represent less than 4% of the Community's energy consumption.
But clearly there is a danger of dependence, because while some Community
Member States are not in the least dependent on Soviet gas, certain Member
States do risk dependence. But the dependence on the Soviet Union is only one
consideration. Gas from the Soviet Union will help the Community to conserve
its own stock of gas and oil and other fuels and will reduce its dependence on
other sources - Libya or the Gulf - which are not likely to be very much more
reliable than Soviet supplies. The problem of dependence has been studied
exhaustively in the Community Member States and by the Community itself,
and we have concluded that it is in our interest to diversify by getting a portion
of our gas from the Soviet Union. This goal has to be accompanied by other"
measures: increasing storage capacity, improving links between gas networks,
and introducing interruptable contracts for industrial clients which will enable
any short-fall in supplies to be remedied more easily.
One can debate the effect of U.S. sanctions on the pipeline project itself, but
there is no doubt that the effect of these measures on U.S. and on European
companies is very damaging. Many companies are involved as main contrac-
tors, subcontractors, or suppliers of equipment, and even if they use no U.S.
technology at all, they will suffer losses of business if the European contribu-
tion to the project is blocked. Some of these companies may not survive. And
some are located in areas of the Community where unemployment is already at
unacceptably high levels.
Another problem is the disruption of contracts concluded in good faith and
the effect which this can have on international business confidence in the
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European firms as suppliers. If a company cannot supply turbines based on
General Electric technology without risk of supply being cut off in the future,
then purchasers will not buy from it. In addition, the usefulness of technologi-
cal links between European and U.S. firms is placed in doubt. The proposal
that contracts once concluded should be allowed to be fulfilled is a very sound
suggestion. U.S. regulations in recent years - the Cuban assets control regula-
tions of 1981 and the Iranian control regulations of 1979 - to a large extent
exempted foreign incorporated firms on the one hand, and on the other, they
permitted existing contracts to be honored.
I might turn to the problem of extraterritoriality. The June regulations can
be summarized as follows: persons within a third country may not re-export
machinery of U.S. origin for the exploration of oil or natural gas or compo-
nents thereof without permission of the U.S. government [32] (which cannot be
obtained). Moreover, any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States is required to get authorization - which again it will not get - for export
to the U.S.S.R. [33]. Thus, it is not just European firms which cannot export
U.S. technology, it is U.S. controlled firms, defined very widely by the June
regulation [341. The result is no exporting for even European technology.
Another provision provides that no person in the United States or in a
foreign country may export or re-export to the U.S.S.R. foreign products
derived from U.S. technical data in the field of oil and gas exploitation, under
three conditions [35]. The first condition forbids export if a written assurance
was required under U.S. export regulations when the data were exported [36].
This condition is reasonable, for at the time that the company bought the
licence it knew problems might occur in re-exporting. Second, exports are
restricted if the recipient of the technical data has agreed to abide by U.S.
export control regulations [37]. Again, if there is such an item in the contract
one can argue that the restriction is reasonable. The third condition, actually
the second in the regulation, restricts exports when the recipient has paid
royalties or other compensation to, or has licensed the use of the technical data
concerned from, any person subject to U.S. jurisdiction [38]. In other words, if
you have paid for your technology, you are not allowed to do what you like
with it.
The extraterritoriality principle could be left aside under certain conditions,
which are not always generally admitted in international law but which have a
certain amount of justification. First of all, there is the "protective" principle
which enables a state to regulate acts performed outside its territory but which
threaten its security. This can hardly apply in the present case because the
protective principle also requires that such acts are generally recognized as
crimes by states with reasonable legal systems. There is nothing criminal about
exports. A second possible exception to the extraterritoriality principle is the
effects doctrine: conduct occurring outside U.S. territory but causing direct,
foreseeable and substantial effects, which are also the constituent elements of a
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crime or tort, can be forbidden. But this doctrine is not presented here either.
There is no direct or substantial effect and there is no element of crime or tort
under U.S. law. If a Community country were to pass regulations similar to the
June 22 amendments [39], it would be doubtful whether these would be
acceptable under U.S. law. The antiforeign boycott provisions of the Export
Administration Act show that the United States cannot accept its companies
being turned into instruments of the foreign policy of other nations. In the
same way, it is difficult for the Community to accept this with regard to
companies incorporated and registered within the Community that follow
some internal trade policy different from Community trade policy. And that is
what is being imposed upon us.
I would like to add one final point: that economic sanctions in general are a
permitted, recognized part of international practice. Examination of the history
of sanctions show that, except in very strictly defined circumstances, sanctions
do not work. Sanctions do not seriously affect the economy of the country they
are directed against, and this is all the more true when that country is one of
the few in the economically independent position of the Soviet Union.
The function of sanctions is to do something other than a hostile warlike act
to express moral reprobation. We find this is perfectly true, and comes when a
government or public opinion cannot accept something like the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan. The government has to show its disgust by some other means
than declarations and the sanction is used for this purpose. If stretched further
than a gesture, a sanction will fall into the danger, which has already occurred
in the pipeline case, of having more serious effects on the economies of the
countries taking the measure and its allies than on the economies of countries
the sanctions are directed against.
Dean Mundheim
Thank you, John. One of your last statements was that sanctions are not a
warlike act. That is a proposition that I know my colleague Noyes Leech has
thought about.
Professor Leech
Under our statutes we distinguish between so-called national security con-
trols and foreign policy controls. My discussion will concern mainly foreign
policy controls. When Congress enacted the foreign policy export controls in
the 1979 Act, it was doubtful that this was a wise and useful step. Testimony at
the hearings by George Ball and Dean Rusk was aimed at dissuading Congress
from enacting these particular kinds of controls [40]. And further, economic
sanctions are not the sole prerogative of the United States; we sometimes can
be on the other end of them as during the OPEC oil embargo.
With that background, I would like to take a look at these sanctions from a
point of view slightly different from their application in a particular case like
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the pipeline. There is a sense in the international community that there should
be significant restraints on the use of this weapon. My question is whether
there are legal restraints required by international law. I suspect that if the
embargoes were more successful, if they did in fact force foreign states to alter
their policies or change their governments, then the call for their abolition
would be louder and far more insistent, and the claim that economic sanctions
violate international legal principles would be more credible.
Let me sketch out the legal context in which it is claimed that sanctions
already violate international law. I would like to start with the United Nations
Charter. We may indeed indict U.N. institutions for their failures to operate
effectively. The near monopoly of force that the Charter gave to the Security
Council has turned into a paralysis of force, and the General Assembly has
frittered away its enormous potential in futile protestations about South Africa
and Israel. But the principles (if not the insitutions) of the Charter are as valid
today as they were in 1945. In particular, take the Charter's express require-
ment in Article 2(4) that all members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the purposes of the United Nations [41]. However cynical we may have become
or however much that injunction is evaded by resort to measures of so-called
self-defense (preserved by Article 51 of the same Charter), no state that I know
of takes the position that the use of force or its threat is a permissible tool in
international relations. The question, of course, is: What kind of force is
prohibited? The majority of commentators have argued that Article 2(4)
encompasses only military force, that this section of the Charter sought only to
abolish the scourge of war. But others have read in this prohibition a broader
injunction against other, nonmilitary forms of force.
Article 19 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, for
example, states that no state may use or encourage the use of coercive
measures of an economic or political character in order to coerce the sovereign
will of another state and obtain from it advantages of any kind [42]. Our
neighbors in this Organization apparently believe that this provision of the
O.A.S. Charter has meaning. When the United States suspended military sales
to Ecuador in 1971, because of our dispute with that country over fishing
rights in waters off the Ecuadorian coast, Ecuador called a meeting of O.A.S.
foreign ministers at which the U.S. economic sanctions were roundly criticized.
The matter was resolved by a resolution supported by both Ecuador and the
United States in which there was a call to abstain from the use of any kind of
measure that may affect the sovereignty of another state. Another example is
the General Assembly resolution entitled "Declaration on Principles of Inter-
national Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations" [43]. One principle
states that no state may use or encourage the use of economic, political, or any
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other type of measures to coerce another state in order to obtain from it the
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it
advantages of any kind. Is this only a political statement? Perhaps, but it is
indicative of a consensus, to which we may not be altogether sensitive, against
the use of forceful nonmilitary coercion.
Maybe we should parse these prohibitions with care and conclude that we
do not and did not seek advantage through economic sanctions against Cuba,
Communist China, Russia, or Poland, or that if we do seek advantages, it is
not to benefit the United States but rather the peoples of these countries. But
this is precisely what the Charters of the U.N. and the O.A.S. and the General
Assembly resolution, are all about: to forestall one nation's use of force -
clearly military force and arguably economic force - in pursuit of its own
unilateral view of preferred political goals.
I say one nation's view, because a major principle of the U.N. Charter is
that coercive action should so far as possible be collective. Collective economic
sanctions give more promise of being effective than unilateral sanctions. But
the principle of collective sanctions serves purposes beyond effectiveness alone.
In a world in which national interests are highly intertwined, the use of
unilateral force, even economic force, is dubious for two reasons. First, it may
be conceived myopically or demagogically, based on premises that cannot be
convincingly defended or cannot be sympathetically accepted even by allies.
And second, it may have negative consequences affecting nations beyond the
two antagonists, consequences that should be weighed by the community, or at
least some significant part of it.
The U.N. Charter and the O.A.S. Charter call for the making of collective
decisions about sanctions. Admittedly, the formal institutions of those charters
are weak. Yet, the pipeline sanctions demonstrate the tragedy of going it alone.
They illustrate the wisdom of seeking collective agreement on sanctions -
agreement in fact, not merely consultation, by whatever formal or informal
means such agreement can be reached. It may be argued that if collective,
agreement is sought, it may be refused, because other states have too much to
lose to join in the effort. This is precisely so. A collective process reveals the
world as it is: a world with multiple and conflicting needs that have to be
balanced against hopes, not a world as viewed only in the present through the
eyes of the U.S. government.
Dean Mundheim
Lou Schwartz, we will let you be the clean-up hitter in our line-up.
Professor Schwartz
Rather than a statement, I have a question, a challenge to one of the
statements you have heard. I am deeply concerned by the scope and vagueness
of the concept of national security, in general in the political and legal life of
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this country, and specifically with reference to the question of the kind of
sanctions that should be imposed. What is not related to national security? In
one recent episode the Department of Defense has intervened in the matter of
restructuring of the telecommunications network of the United States [44],
which obviously has security implications. I have encountered many antitrust
cases in which the court was advised to suspend operations or tailor the relief
with a view to national security. National security is certainly affected by the
political structure of a country. And the end of the line "everything affects
national security" is martial law such as in Poland. You ought not to have
unions that disrupt production, you ought not to have this squabbling that
obfuscates our national position. In other words, it is an extremely broad and
elusive concept.
It seems to me that the Department of Defense has taken an imaginative
view of its role in defining this undefinable matter. One would not say that the
Department of Defense was getting out of bounds if it intervened in a
projected sale of military equipment or material to a country that we are
planning to invade or defend against. Obviously, anything that directly changes
the balance of military power is a concern of the Department of Defense. But
when you get beyond that, it seems to me that the Department of Defense
ought to speak very softly. The Department of State expresses our interna-
tional policy, of course not on our defense, but taking it into consideration
along with a lot else. I am grateful that you came here, Bill, but I wonder what
you would say about the limitless definition of security and the role of the
Defense Department in defining our national and international domestic
structure.
Mr. Taft
I am delighted to be here, and I think that the point you have made, that
not everything is connected with national security, is not one I wish to quarrel
with. I am here because I was invited, but I have no doubt that the Department
of State and our foreign policy considerations are dominant in the area we are
talking about. As far as the pipeline is concerned, it has been explicitly pointed
out that these sanctions were not invoked under the national security section of
the statute but under the foreign policy section. We do recognize that distinc-
tion. In the Department of Defense, we do not view our responsibility for the
national security as a license to roam in the field of antitrust anymore than in
the fields of labor relations or foreign policy. At the same time, there are
activities with which we are concerned and the communications sector is
definitely one. National security, for which we do have responsibility, is
affected by the communications industry structure that may be determined in
antitrust cases. We participated in the AT&T antitrust case [45], but we did
not say that the national security issues necessarily had to determine the
outcome of the case. We did say they were important factors to be considered
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in the public interest and we worked with the Justice Department in that case.
We work with the Labor Department on matters of labor unrest, with the
Commerce Department on the export of critical technology and with the State
Department on foreign policy. I do not disagree with you that the mandate for
national security matters is limited, and it should be.
Dean Mundheim
Lou, you may recall that Myer Rashish had been invited as a panelist to
convey the State Department philosophy, but could not be here. Bill Taft's
presence does not represent a view that the Defense Department is the only
agency of government concerned with sanctions.
I would like to open the floor now for questions of the panelists and for
discussion.
Mr. Shestack (Schnader, Harrison, Segal, and Lewis, Philadelphia, PA; U.S.
Representative to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 1979-80)
I was interested in the question of double standards. This administration
brushes aside the seeming inconsistencies of sanctioning grain exports to the
U.S.S.R. while pursuing pipeline sanctions, which you explained realistically in
terms of voters in Iowa. With respect to Chile and Argentina, and other Latin
American countries, all of the criteria that you set forth including the ability of
sanctions to affect policy, and the equitable bearing of the costs of the
sanctions would seem to call for sanctions. Yet, the United States now has
reversed the policy of the prior Administration with respect to economic and
military assistance to countries such as Argentina and Chile. In Chile, the most
recent example, the human rights situation has clearly deteriorated. Yet, it
seems rather obvious that high members of this Administration want to certify
Chile as a case where economic and military aid should be rendered. The prior
Administration was severely criticized, and sometimes justly, for application of
double standards; this Administration seems to be doing the same thing, but
more egregiously so.
Dean Mundheim
Bill, would like to take a crack at this question?
Mr. Taft
I see a very great difference between the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact
members and the Latin American members of the O.A.S. We have a different
relationship with them. And the differences stem from the military and foreign
policies that the Soviet Union pursues, and the effect that those policies have
on us and the policies that are pursued by Chile, Argentina, and other
members of the O.A.S. These countries simply are not in the same boat and
our economic relations with them should be treated differently. The sanctions
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that have been in effect against some Latin American countries in no sense
were directed toward their international policies or any military threat, except
to the extent that we did impose an arms embargo on Argentina during the
Falkland Island crisis. That is the fundamental difference and you do not need
a double standard to reach a different result when you are starting from a
different base.
Dean Mundheim
Lee Marks, do you want to add to that?
Mr. Marks
I must say that I find myself very much in agreement with what Bill Taft
has said. There is a serious question whether the imposition of export controls
against Chile and Argentina during the Carter Administration was effective in
influencing the behavior of those countries or was warranted in the interest of
the United States. It is one thing to say that if a country has an authoritarian
regime you are not going to sell it thumb screws or cattle prods or other torture
instruments. But I do not see that any interest of the United States was served,
for example, when we told Westinghouse that we would not provide
Import-Export Bank financing for a $400 million turbine generator project in
Argentina and thereby ensured that the order would go instead to a German
firm. I do not think it affected Argentina's internal or external policies. All it
did was to demonstrate that the United States is not a good country to do
business with. (I do not assert that as a true proposition but rather something
which the Carter Administration tended inadvertently to establish.) I do not
think there is a double standard being practiced by the current Administration
(even though I disagree with the pipeline controls). I do not think the answer
to human rights violations is the imposition of controls upon Chile and
Argentina, and .probably to the extent that the Carter Administration did, it
was a mistake.
Mr. Downey (Sutherland, Asbill, and Brennan, Washington, D.C.; Deputy
Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1975-77)
I have a hypothetical question for Mr. Taft, and perhaps others might wish
to join in the response. My own views with respect to the pipeline are that the
President's action was a petulant one, accomplished with a legal blunderbuss.
It was and is virtually indefensible on any score. I also represent clients here
and in Europe who are now faced with the grisly problem of complying with
your sanctions and U.S. law, thereby having European criminal actions threa-
tened against them; or if they fail to comply with U.S. law, having the same
thing threatened in the United States. My hypothetical, though, is an effort to
take some of the passion out of the discussion of a foreign policy action. I
would like to draw on the extraterritorial comment that Lee Marks made and
just flip the situation.
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An American company, American Motors, has a French company, Renault,
acquire shares in its stock to a point where Renault has a controlling interest in
American Motors. Renault also supplies technology to American Motors, a
new design for a car. American Motors gets a contract to sell $100 million
worth of cars to a Central American country called Ameco. This contract is
important for the United Auto Workers and the automobile industry in the
United States, and is fully consistent with U.S. foreign and trade policy. The
government of France, however, while happy to sell a Concorde and French
bread to Ameco, does not wish anyone to sell automobiles to Ameco. The
French Government then declares that American Motors is subject to the
jurisdiction of France by virtue of its ownership and control by French citizen
Renault or by American Motors' use of French technology. It then tells
American Motors, "You must cancel your contract with Ameco or you will be
subjected to sanctions of the French government." What action do you think
the U.S. Government should take in defense of U.S. national interests, and do
you think the French action is consistent with international law?
Dean Mundheim
Bill, do you want to start or should I hand that over to one of our other
panelists?
Mr. Taft
I ought to say initially that I do not agree with your characterization of the
pipeline sanctions. Your hypothetical raises, most importantly, the question of
the relationship between the governments. The U.S. Government, in the
position that you posit, should work with the French Government to resolve
difficulties. I understand that failure of the two governments to act consistently
toward a single private entity causes problems for that entity. Even if that was
not the case, it would be desirable for the allies to work together. We are trying
to work out our differences. The fact that we have not been successful in
resolving our differences with the European governments to date, and that
private companies are therefore experiencing difficulty, is something we will
have to work on.
Dean Mundheim
1 want to put the legal question that resided in that hypothetical. Noyes,
what is the result if American Motors is sued for breach of contract in a federal
district court?
Professor Leech
The U.S. court will take the position that we clearly have jurisdiction over
the American Motors company. I do not even think we have to concede that
France has jurisdiction, and we probably would argue against that, although I
think that is a separate question.
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The point being made here about extraterritorial jurisdiction is an interest-
ing legal point. We have changed that position in the scholarly community in
the last twenty years. When the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States was drafted in the early 1960s, the American Law Institute's
position was that for subsidiaries of foreign corporations the jurisdiction of a
state rests upon the nationality of those who control the foreign corporations
[46]. A subtle change has occurred, for which Andy Lowenfeld has been partly
responsible, and he can speak up for himself. But the current draft of the
revision of the Restatement says flatly that we have jurisdiction over the
subsidiary itself, if a U.S. parent has control [47]. But jurisdiction is only half
the question. In many cases two states have jurisdiction over a single person or
event, and over the years we have tried to work out accommodations for that.
The early Restatement established a set of criteria to weigh the respective
national interests, among other things, in determining which state ought to
concede the other state's stronger right to control the event [48]. That same
process is continued under the new Restatement [49]. The Lowenfeld formula-
tion is that we look to the reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction. I do
not think you can avoid conflicts like those posed in the hypothetical, but they
have to be resolved and are not resolvable simply through taking a very rigid
position on the question of jurisdiction alone.
Mr. Marks
On the question of what the U.S. courts would do, Sumitomo Shoji America,
Inc. v. Avagliano [501 is worth mentioning. Though its facts are very different,
in terms of how American courts look at things it has some relevancy.
Sumitomo is a sex discrimination case brought by female employees of the U.S.
subsidiary of a major Japanese trading company. Sumitomo sends Japanese
male employees everywhere it operates, including the United States. The
technical legal issue involved the construction of the 1953 Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce, and Navigation between the United States and Japan, under
which Japanese companies had the right in the United States to employ
executives of their choice [51]. Even conceding that the treaty overrode Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, the question was whether the U.S. branch of
Sumitomo, incorporated here and owned by Sumitomo in Japan, should be
considered as a U.S. or a Japanese corporation. The opinion of the Supreme
Court is based on a construction of the treaty. Nonetheless, it is fairly clear
that the Court's motivation was that somehow a U.S. corporation ought to be
subject to the civil rights laws, no matter who owned it. That is, of course, the
hypothetical that Art Downey is trying to pose. When you flip it around, we
tend to feel that if incorporated here, you are one of ours, and if incorporated
over there, but owned by us, you are still one of ours.
Professor Lowenfeld (New York University Law School)
I want to respond to the invitation Noyes Leech gave me and talk a little
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fk Vo it p nt T il,,lgI nlzn like tn make a counle of other responses
to today's comments: first of all, the question whether economic sanctions are
a flop. The historical answer seems much more ambiguous than our discussion
has indicated. In Rhodesia, for example, though in the end the situation was
solved by war, clearly the sanctions kept the courage of those who revolted
against Smith alive in a way that would not have happened had there been no
sanctions. The sanctions kept a subject as an international issue that otherwise
would have gone away. In Iran [former Deputy Secretary of the Treasury] Bob
Carswell says, it was the freezing of Iran's assets that in the long run led to the
settlement [52]. That may be an overstatement, but the freezing of assets was
certainly not irrelevant. The effectiveness of sanctions on the Soviet Union is
hard to estimate. I suspect that though the Soviet Union did not pull out of
Afghanistan after the reaction to its invasion, the fact that it did not, for
example, go into Iran may have had something to do with the sharpness of the
United States' reaction measured by the sanctions imposed. Furthermore, who
is to tell whether the reaction to the Afghanistan invasion did not have
something to do with the fact that the Soviet Union did not invade Poland in
1981. So I think the question is really much more ambiguous. It is not like a
lawsuit where somebody wins and sombody loses. I think one ought to keep in
mind the various motivations behind sanctions.
My second point concenis the definition of "existing contract". When we
imposed sanctions against Rhodesia and when Britain imposed sanctions
against Argentina during the Falkland Islands crisis, the governments ignored
existing contracts and deferred questions of damages and on whom the risk
falls. When the United States tried to get the European allies to join them in
sanctions against Iran, the Europeans were quite reluctant. Eventually, the
EEC agreed to impose sanctions, but only subject to fulfillment of existing
contracts. That was particularly at the insistence of the British. And then the
British began to interpret existing contracts as including dealings with parties
that had previously dealt together but were not contractually bound. Thus, the
exception for existing contracts looms so large that you can understand the
United States being reluctant to exempt them.
The third thing I would like to speak on is this question of national security
or foreign policy justifications. Lou Schwartz made a nice statement that one
can use national security to cover almost anything. For example, section 232 of
the Trade Expansion Act [53], was used to keep foreign oil out to protect Texas
oil and we called it "national security". That seems rather ironic now. On the
other hand, it seems to me that the effort by Congress to distinguish "national
security" for which the President does not have to make any findings and
foreign policy on which he has to apply a whole series of criteria [54] is a
failure partly because the President can invoke either one. For instance, in the
grain embargo he invoked both national security and foreign policy.
If you look at it in Constitutional terms, however, why shouldn't the
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President determine that, let us say, an invasion of a far-off country in Central
Asia in some way threatens the national security? It is not that the wheat, or
the grain, or the weight of the hogs who eat it are a national security issue. It is
that the President wants to do something to protest the invasion. While it is
fair to say that former President Carter and President Reagan have under-
mined and frustrated the intent of Congress in passing the 1979 Act, that
intent was, I think, somewhat misguided. I am not defending the various
embargoes, but I think it is worth considering the point in a Constitutional
context, i.e. the degree to which Congress can or should limit the President's
judgment in the conduct of foreign affairs.
The fourth question is the issue of foreign availability. When Lee Marks
talked about the Oshkosh trucks situation, he said both that they were sold
off-the-shelf and that they took ten months to manufacture. Availability is not
always quite clear, and it is interesting to see the role played by the multina-
tionals in this context. A series of products - computers are a good example -
is available in Europe, for instance, as well as in the United States. But when
one looks carefully at the European sellers, one finds that they turn out to be
European subsidiaries of American companies, so the technical test, whether
the product is available, breaks down.
My last point is the question of jurisdiction and international law. It is
interesting that everybody cites the Restatements. Mr. Maslen had before him
the EEC D6marche, which cites both the 1965 Restatement, in which Professor
Leech had a prominent part, and the current tentative drafts in which I have
had a role [55]. That both sides cite the Restatement is as it should be, for that
gives a certain legitimacy to the whole Restatement process. Now, what does
the Restatement say on the question of legislative or regulatory jurisdiction? I
do not think anybody believes that a company stops at the water's edge, or
that it is improper for a country to tell a multinational corporation that a
consolidated tax return is expected. Various kinds of credits and deductions
are given to avoid double taxation, but of course a tax form is demanded.
There are other things which no country would dream of doing. No one would
say Dresser-France has to comply with the Wage and Hour Act [56] of the
United States, for instance.
Quite clearly there is overlap in jurisdiction. For individuals it is easy:
jurisdiction is based on either territoriality or citizenship. If I travel to Paris
with an American passport, clearly the United States has some jurisdiction
over me, though not total. Well, what about a company that travels to France?
The argument is that the United States has jurisdiction over a wholly-owned
subsidiary, at least, and one can argue about the minimum level of control
required to accord jurisdiction to the United States. There is also, of course,
some jurisdiction in the host country. The new Restatement, building on a
germ of an idea from section 40 of the first Restatement, says that given
overlap and conflict, the rule is reasonableness [57]. Reasonableness is defined
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in terms of the expectations, of other competing interests and so on.
It seems to me reasonableness is the test against which, for example, the
pipeline issue should be measured. Once that test is applied, whatever the
result, there is less of a conflict. The United States would understand better the
European reaction as a legal matter and the Europeans would not say quite so
flatly that the sanctions are a violation of international law. A plea for
reasonableness is something that is easier to make in a law school forum than,
for instance, at the Security Council of the United Nations. But that is the
effort we are trying to make.
Dean Mundheim
Thank you Andy. I want to pick upon one thing. I am reluctant to
characterize the Iranian assets freeze as an example of successful sanctions,
and I don't recall Bob Carswell categorizing it in precisely that way. My own
assessment is that the primary importance of the freeze was the availability of
a bargaining chip to use once Iran had decided for other reasons to release the
hostages, because a successful negotiation requires something to give to the
other side. But I do not think the asset freeze actually drove Iran to the
bargaining table.
Professor Kravis (Economics Department, University of Pennsylvania)
Mr. Lowenfeld's comment that the results of an embargo were ambiguous
seems to be a congenial subject for an economist. I think the effects of an
embargo have to be considered as raising the cost to its target of carrying on
business as usual. The extent to which those costs are raised depends upon the
relative size of the entities imposing the embargo and its object. Rhodesia was
a fairly small country and the embargo was being imposed by many other
countries, probably the preponderant economic and productive world powers.
Yet, Rhodesia was able to carry on for quite some time despite what was
supposed to be a total embargo. Channels could always be found, and
Rhodesia used these to buy imports that she wanted, but at a higher price;
Rhodesia found channels for her usual exports but she had to take lower
prices. In the case of a small Latin American country like Chile, the effect of
an American embargo alone would have been more substantial and if there
had been a similar cohesive embargo by all the industrial countries, results
,would have been produced more quickly.
The embargoes are not cost-free to those imposing them and where one
country imposes an embargo on a very large country, it may be damaging itself
more than the other country. In general, countries are very loath to change
their policies under pressure, and the Soviet Union or the United States can
withstand many cost increases. It is questionable whether the economic effects
of an embargo achieve any substantial result. If the embargo is intended to
make a political statement, that is different, but if economic effects are
expected, you are very likely going to be disappointed.
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Mr. Shestack
I think both Mr. Marks and Mr. Taft have taken a rather narrow compass
of foreign policy. The foreign policy of the United States not only seeks to
advance national security, but trade and human rights, as Mr. Maslen con-
cedes. The three are linked. As a member of the U.S. Delegation in Madrid
during the Helsinki Conference, I emphasized that progress with respect to
security and trade regarding the Eastern bloc could not come without progress
in human rights.
Human rights has been declared by Congress to be part of the foreign policy
of the United States, and under the Foreign Assistance Act [58] the United
States cut off military aid to Argentina and Chile. Mr. Marks is dubious
whether that had any effect, but that doubt is not shared by people in the
human rights community. Argentina had been engaged in the practice of
"disappearance", and some 15,000 people had disappeared. As a result of
bilateral pressure from the United States and the United Nations, they sharply
reduced that pratice, through they have not cured it. There was also progress in
Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay.
I see double standards in that the United States is now applying a different
human rights standard to the Eastern block than to the authoritarian govern-
ments in Latin America. That has been justified, as Mr. Taft did, by military or
national security considerations. That really raises Lou Schwartz's point. If you
analyze it, there is really no national security involved in giving military aid to
Argentina. The Defense Department did not object when military aid to
Argentina was cut off during the Carter Administration and did not find any
overriding national security concerns then. This Administration found national
security concerns until the Falkland Islands crisis occurred, when they were
willing to bypass those concerns. From a human rights viewpoint, it makes
very little difference to the mother of someone who has disappeared whether
the abduction was done by an authoritarian government or a totalitarian
government. The panel has focused on foreign policy with respect to exports
and imports, but has taken into consideration few of the other elements of
foreign policy which Mr. Maslen included in his talk. Human rights is an
integral part of U.S. foreign policy declared by Congress, which certainly has a
role.
Mr. Marks
First, I share your view about Argentina. It is basically a despicable regime
and I am all for cutting off military assisitance to it. I feel that economic
assistance is quite different. I worked on human rights problems in the Carter
Administration, and think that the human rights legislation passed by Con-
gress is largely ineffective in promoting human rights. It was impossible to
administer by the State Department as seen by an endless series of irrational
ad hoc decisions, almost any one of which was indefensible when compared
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with another one. The human rights policies of both the Carter and Reagan
Administrations are equally foolish, although on opposite ends of the spec-
trum. There is no need to become the champion and best friend of an
Argentine regime, as Alexander Haig did, or to become a world nag, as I think
President Carter did.
The real question is when does it make sense to use export controls to
attempt to influence behavior. We cut off military assistance to Argentina and
Chile out of a sense of moral outrage, not because we really believed it would
promote positive change or affect their behavior. Argentine behavior and
Chilean behavior have moderated for reasons having to do with their econo-
mies and internal politics and needs. We did not serve any useful U.S. purpose
by sending $400 million in sales of generators to Germany, away from
Westinghouse in the United States. That is my only point in addressing the
Argentine and Chilean situations.
Professor Schwartz
The last three speakers have provided material for what I want to say. We
have heard of ineffectual sanctions, of double standards, of harming ourselves.
For me this points to an important aspect of sanctions as protest, those which
may not accomplish economic penalties but express our views. Protest is a kind
of suprarational concept. As lawyers, as academics, we are rationalizers. But
deep down the springs of behavior are irrational, and if a President is given a
mandate with seventeen mutually inconsistent guides to policy, the thing that
is going to determine the policy is irrational. A person who sets fire to himself
to protest a course of action is self-destructive and not rational, but he is
making a statement of some sort. Much of the activity that we have been
reviewing today strikes me as having that dimension. I honestly do not know
how to reconcile the fundamental irrationality of many of our most important
decisions with our equally fundamental commitment to rationality. It may be
that compelling ourselves and others to rationalize will set some limits to the
self-destructive tendencies of pure protest. But as human beings we should not
fool ourselves, and mask our rationality and irrationality totally with this
superstructure.
Dean Mundheim
Perhaps on that warning note we ought to close for the day.
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